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Your Terms or Mine?
The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts
Avery Katz
The rules of contract law, as administered by courts and other public officials, regulate many
aspects of private exchange. Among the most puzzling and difficult of these rules (at least, in the
opinion of lawyers) are those regarding the formation and interpretation of contracts. Such rules
govern the questions: which objectively verifiable actions suffice to conclude a bargain and form a
contractual obligation; and how do the parties' objective actions affect the substantive content of
any contract that is formed?
Legal rules of contract formation and interpretation have so far attracted little attention from
economists, even among those studying contract law. Instead, the literature has largely focused
on other doctrinal areas dealing with the consequences of contracts once formed. It would be
surprising, however, if formation and interpretation rules were merely conventional, as they often
seem to be regarded in the law-and-economics literature. Bargaining theory tells us that when
information is imperfect or communication costly, self-interested parties will generally fail to realize
the full surplus from exchange. Just how much is wasted will depend on the precise structure of
the institutions that govern the bargaining. Different legal rules will result in different background
structures, and will induce different bargaining games. Hence they can have important consequences
for the outcome and efficiency of exchange.
This paper examines the legal rules that govern the interpretation of non-dickered (and usually
unread) printed terms appearing in standardized form contracts. Such contracts have been in wide
commercial use for decades, as they provide a way for regular market participants to conserve
on transaction costs and to realize economies of scale in marketing. Their legal interpretation,
however, has generated considerable controversy among courts and legal commentators, and over
the past few decades the law governing them has been in flux. In recent years, courts have been
increasingly willing to ignore fine-print terms and interpret form contracts against the interests of
the drafting party. Nonetheless, various legal rules are still applied to the problem today, and for
lawyers the question remains: to what extent do and should standardized contract terms govern a
bargain? Alternatively, one might take the viewpoint of a person faced with an offer embodied in
a standard form, and ask: is there or should there be a duty to read the fine print?
I am gratefpl1 to Mark Bagnoli, Ken Binmnore, Sharon Feldman, Leo Katz, Steven Shavell, and Hal Varian for
helpful comments, and to the Cook Fund of the University of Michigan Law School for Ifnancial support.
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I develop below a simple model of bargaining in the form-contract setting, and use the model to
investigate the consequences of a variety of possible legal rules governing contract interpretation.
The analysis grows out of the basic insight that whatever the legal rule, no one who is offered a
form contract in equilibrium will read the fine print. The underlying intuition for this is roughly the
following: suppose there were some persons who read the fine print, in order to obtain information
about product quality or similar aspects of the contract. Of this hypothetical set of readers, consider
the subset among them who value quality most. This subset will get quality no higher than the
level that is just necessary to induce them to accept the offer. Therefore, they lose their sunk costs
of reading, will not find it worthwhile to expend the effort to read in the first place, and will drop
out of the group of readers. But the argument can be repeated with the most quality-sensitive
among those remaining, and the equilibrium unravels until eventually there are no readers left.
Accordingly, a rule that attaches harsh consequences to a failure to read contracts carefully -
contrary to the claims of some legal commentators - will not induce persons to start reading the
fine print. Such a rule will only cause some exchanges to be foregone.
This conclusion has several implications for the legal rules of contract interpretation. One
consequence is that there will be no effective difference between a rule that holds the drafter of a
form contract responsible for communicating the terms of the fine print, and one that holds the
recipient responsible. In either case, the expense of any communication will be borne by the drafter
alone. A second consequence is that courts or regulatory authorities can improve social welfare by
providing implied warranties and by refusing to give effect to fine-print terms.
The model can also be understood as an extension of George Akerlof's well-known analysis
of the market for lemons. As Akerlof and others have argued, market equilibrium is inefficient
when there is no institution available that provides information about the differing attributes of
heterogeneous buyers and sellers. One particular institution that has been widely suggested as
serving this purpose is the warranty contract, in which one party to a transaction promises the
other that the exchange will be of a specific nature. Warranties and other analogous promises can
only provide a solution to the lemons problem, however, if individual buyers and sellers find it in
their interests to communicate and learn about the particular terms of exchange. The discussion
to follow indicates that they often will lack the incentive to do so when communication is costly.
Their incentives, however, can be altered in this regard by the rule of law.
These ideas are developed more fully in the several sections below. Section 1 begins by intro-
ducing some economic and legal background on the issue of form contracts. Section 2 presents my
model of contract negotiation in the form-contract setting, and derives the model's equilibrium
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outcome under a variety of legal rules. Section 3 presents the welfare economics of the various
rules. Section 4 suggests extensions of the analysis aid cogcludes.
1. Form contracts: economic and legal background
In a mass production economy the terms for exchange of goods between buyer and seller obvi-
ously need to be standardized in some fashion, as the cost of repeated individual negotiations is
high, especially for complex goods and transactions. As a result, many who participate in the mar-
ket on a regular basis find it worthwhile to develop standard written forr.s which set out in print
the terms upon which the drafter proposes to do business. This enables them to take advantage of
economiep pf scale in determining the terms that maximise their surplus from the transaction, and
in drafting the written agreement that embodies those terms.
If the standard forms are to serve their function of economizing on the costs of negotiation,
each individual exchange cannot provide the occasion for re-opening the terms of the bargain. At
a minimum, the written terms must be regarded as at least presumptively non-negotiable; and in
practice, such a presumption may be impossible to override. In fact, form contracts in actual use
often provide that the negotiating agent lacks the authority to vary the written terms.1
The fact that certain terms are not negotiable, of course, does not mean that there is no
negotiation at all. Typical written forms leave blank spaces to be filled in with essential terms that
are actually dickered - usually including price, quantity, and the da.te of shiprment or deliyery, In
general, one would expect the negotiable terms to be adjusted in individual transactions, depending
on fpw the printed terms affct the individual circumstances of the drafter's partner.
If the content of the standard forms is completely understood by both bargainers, one might
think that there would be no strong social welfare concerns regarding their use, apart from any
second-best considerations arising from the interaction of form contracts with other market imper-
fections such as monopoly. If both parties know the terms of the form contract and bear the full
costs of negotiation, one might conjecture that they would choose to use form contracts whenever
the savings in negotiation costs outweigh the advantages of tailoring the bargain to their individual
needs. It is not difficult, indeed, to devise a simple competitive mnodel in which this is the result.
1 Suchi disclairners are presuniably intended to address the agency problem faced by the drafter of the contract, given
the negotiating agent's compensation contract. Otherwise, the agent might be tempted to vary the contract in a
way tihat his princips.1 rpight not wish, la order to obtain an additlenal sale and cornrission. For example, inarance
agents typically have the incentive to write contracts insuring excessively poor risks; for this reason such contracts
commonly provide (in fmne print) that the insurance contract is subject to the ultirnate approval of the insurer's horne
office.
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Despite their evident advantages, however, form contracts have been received by courts and by
legal commentators with ambivalence and, on occasion, with suspicion. In part, this is because
of the association some lawyers have drawn between such contracts and the alleged presence of
market power. The take-it-or-leave-it aspect that form contracts display with regard to some
terms of exchange has been analogized to the power a monopolist has over price.2 According
to one prominent school of thought, for instance, form contracts are referred to as "contracts of
adhesion" and are regarded as inherently coercive.3
The law's ambivalence toward form contracts, however, goes beyond the fact that a party faced
with a form offer is unable to negotiate all terms individually with the offeror. More importantly,
contracting parties, often consumers, often purport to accept form offers without knowing or under-
standing the terms within. This is individually rational, since the cost of reading and considering
the meaning of each term is costly, and many of the terms deal with the consequences of improbable
contingencies. Few consumers attempt to read all the terms of their leases, insurance policies, or
automobile loan contracts, although they may occasionally make a show of doing so in order not to
appear unsophisticated. Of those who do try to read form contracts, fewer understand them, since
the terms are often written in fine print to save on the costs of paper and handling, and expressed
unclearly or in legal or technical jargon in order to save on the expenses of drafting.
The situation is not confined to consumer contracts. Purchasing agents do not read the nonessen-
tial terms of price quotation sheets and sales agents do not read the terms of purchase orders; it
simply is not worth their time and effort to do so. Moreover, some of the terms of standard forms
are primarily included for purposes of internal organizational control, and only secondarily for their
effects on the bargain. Quite commonly, agents of the drafting party do not even know the contents
of their own forms, although their principals presumably do.
The fact that form contracts are often accepted unread poses both theoretical and practical
problems with their enforcement. The practical problem, of course, is that imperfect information
about contract terms can lead to efficiency losses from adverse selection and moral hazard, and to
unfair redistribution of wealth when contracting parties are surprised by the terms to which they
are bound. Legal commentators have additionally been concerned with a more theoretical problem:
2 Admittedly, the analogy has often been poorly reasoned; the fact that several firrns in an industry include simnilar
terms in their standard forms has been regarded by sorne courts as prima facie evidence of either conspiracy or
oligopoly. Furthermore, legal coramentators have incorrectly assurned that the presence of rnarket power generally
implies that terms chosen by sellers 'will be excessively or inefficiently favorable to sellers, by supposed analogy to the
effect of market power on price.
3 See, e.g., Kessler (1943), RakofI (1983).
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how is it possible for a person freely to agree to be bound by an obligation without knowing just
what he is agreeing to? According to orthodox contract theory, the formation of a contract requires
mutual assent, sometimes described as a "meeting of the minds." Economists may regard the issue
as a metaphysical one, but legal philosophers have found three major approaches to this question.
Each approach depends to a greater or lesser extent on the use of a fiction; each results in a different
rule of interpretation.
One possibility is that by accepting a form offer, a consumer4 agrees to delegate the authority
to the seller to set whatever non-dickered terms he pleases. Lawyers usually refer to this rule by
saying that the consumer has a "duty to read" the contract; if he neglects this duty he waives any
objection to the consequences. The "duty to read" is often said to have been the position of the
traditional Anglo-American common law at the beginuing of this century, although its harshness
was undoubtedly mitigated in some cases by the effect of other legal doctrines. One obvious
advantage of tNs rple is its relative ease of administration, since to determine the contract's content
one simply consults its written provisions.
A second possibility, at the other extreme, is that the offer of a form contract is interpreted
as containing the set of non-dickered terms that is most in the consumer's interest. When the
consumer accepts, he gets those terms. This rule is sometimes described as implying a "duty to
speak" on the part of the drafter, who risks being bound unfavorably if he does not bring the
content of any standardized terms to the consumer's attention. Defenders of the "duty to speak"
argue that the seller knows both that the consumer will not read and that it is not reasonable for
him to read. Sometimes they also argue that the seller, as creator of the terms, is in a position to
bring them to the buyer's attention more easily and cheaply.
A third and intermediate possibility is that the parties to a form contract agree that non-
djckered terms will be governed by some external citerion, either custom or, in some fonnulations,
the imagined judgment of some hypothetical impartial observer (the "reasonable person"). It is up
to either party to make special negotiating efforts if he does not like the customary standard. This
rule is the most costly to administer, since the court enforcing the contract will have to determine
the dictates of custom or of the reasonable person. Over time, however, as courts decide many such
disputes, the external criterion will naturally become more clearly defmned.
Combinations of these three basic approaches are also possible. For instance, one could imagine
a rule which gives the seller the authority to set the contract terms within certain limits, with the
4 For concreteness, the rest of the discussion in this paper will proceed as if the drafters of formn contracts are always
firms offering products for sale, and the offerees are always consumers. Nothing in the analysis depends upon this
chara4ctrisation.
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limits arising from custom or from the reasonable person standard. If the seller wishes to set the
terms outside those limits, he must speak; if the buyer wishes to avoid being bound by the seller's
choice within the limits, he must read. Or, the legal rule might provide that the printed terms are
effective if the buyer learns about them in any way, either by the seller's efforts or his own, while
if there is no communication, the presumptive standard governs. One might call this an "actual
knowledge" standard.
Alternatively, the legal rule could dispense entirely with freedom of contract and simply require
a particular set of terms - one that the parties would not be free to negotiate around even
if they bargained explicitly. Like form contracts, legal requirements are a way to provide the
benefits .of standardization, albeit on a centralized rather than decentralized basis. Such a rule
has obvious costs when the population of buyers and sellers is heterogeneous, but it saves on
negotiation and could conceivably be desirable in a second-best environment. Current contract
law has some provisions for absolutely required and prohibited terms, primarily in consumer good
settings. Usually these requirements are justified on the grounds of consumer irrationality, but
sometimes they are also defended on the grounds of avoiding wasteful or fraudulent attempts to
offer terms that no rational consumer would accept.
Current law applies each of these approaches in various settings. Debates among legal com-
mentators tend to be between those who stress the benefits of standardization and decentralization
on one hand, and those who stress either the fairness of the transaction or the metaphysical re-
quirements of mutual assent. Occasionally one finds informal justifications of the duty to read on
transactions costs grounds (more commonly in older cases), but when courts assert that the duty
to read is more efficient, they usually are speaking in terms of their own costs of adjudication and
enforcement.
We will pose the question somewhat differently. Given the benefits of standardization, which
rule best trades off the two goals of saving on negotiation costs and choosing the terms best suited
to individual circumstances? The next section develops a simple model of contract bargaining in
the form-contract setting in which to make the question more precise. The model is necessarily and
deliberately oversimplified. But, it includes in its assumptions the minimal conditions necessary
to make the problem interesting: private and social costs associated with suboptimally chosen
contract terrns, a positive cost associated with reading others' form contracts or explaining one's
own forms to others, and heterogeneous buyers and sellers, so that a social planner cannot achieve
the first-best by setting required terrns.
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2. A model of form-contract bargaining
Cpnsider a single seller who offers a contract to sell a good to a single buyer, who can either
accept or reject the offer without further consideration. Alternatively, the buyer can choose to read
the cpntract if the feller has not already explained its contents. Suppose there is a population of such
buyers and sellers of various types (alternatively, one may think of some probability distribution
defined over types of buyers and sellers). Also suppose that the buyer either buys a single unit of
the good or none at all.
The good, or the contract for its sale, can have varying amounts of some characteristic. I call
this characteristic "quality" in order to link up this analysis with the literature on product quality.
But the characteristic might also usefully be thought of a warranty, a provision for arbitration in
the event of a dispute, the allocation of delivery costs, or the like. This characteristic is denoted
by the scalar variable x E [0,1]; corresponding to the possibility, for example, that a product may
llave no warranty, a partial warranty, or a full warranty.
Assume that the seller's marginal cost of production is constant with respect to quantity. Denots
it as ak(x ), where k(-) is a cost functioi common to all sellers, and a is a scalar variable denoting
the seller's type. Assume that additional levels of quality are increasingly costly for all seller types,
so that k'(x) > 0 and k"(x) > 0. The degree to which marginal cost varies with z, though,
varies according to the type a. Similarly, the buyer's willingness to pay for a unit of the good
is V - bc(x), where V denotes the good's value aside from considerations of quality, c(-) is a cost
function common to all buyers, and b denotes the buyer's type. Assume that the buyer's reservation
price rises with quality, but at a decreasing rate, so that c'(a) < 0 and c"(x) > 0. Intuitively, a
denotes the intensity of the seller's preference for low x, while b denotes the intensity of the buyer's
preference for high z.
I suppose there are a continuum of types of buyers inde i by b, with finite support [bo, b1]. The
probability that the buyer is of type b < t is described by the cumulative density function F(t),
which has associated probability density function f(t). Similarly, I will usually suppose that there
are also a continuum of types of sellers indexed by a, with finite support [ao, al] and cumulative
density function G(-), but occasionally I will assume that all sellers are of the same type a. Notice
that buyers and sellers' preferences regarding the value of a; are always strictly opposed given price
and quantity; this assumption will be important in determnining the equilibrium. Notice that with
a fully informed buyer, expected demand becomes more elastic as a; increases, and the seller can
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accordingly capture more of the consumer surplus. In fact, if c(1) = 0, then demand is perfectly
elastic and a seller can capture the full surplus from the transaction. 5
The bargaining process allows the seller to specify price and quality, and also to choose between
standard terms and individual negotiation. The seller offers a contract for sale to the buyer in
a written form that can be described by the three variables (P, z, a). P is the price, and it is
costlessly visible to the buyer. The variable z E [0,1] denotes the seller's proposal for the value of
x; depending on the legal rule in force, the actual value of x implied by the final contract may or
may not be the same as the seller's proposal z. The value of z cannot be observed by the buyer
without some cost. This cost, however, can be borne either by the buyer or by the seller. a denotes
the probability that the seller bears this cost, sending an explicit offer that the buyer sees as (P, z).
If the seller sends a form offer, in contrast, the buyer sees only the price P.
The seller can notify the buyer of the true value of z, or "speak," at a cost of S. I interpret this
as using individualized negotiation instead of a form contract.6 If the seller does not speak, the
buyer can "read," and inspect the offer himself at a cost of R, thus learning the value of z. After
the seller decides on an offer and the buyer decides whether to read, the buyer decides whether to
accept based on his information about P and z. Denote the probability that a buyer of type b reads
a form offer P as p(P, b), the probability that he accepts a form offer without reading as a(P, b),
and the probability that he declines a form offer without'reading it as 1 - a - p. If the buyer ever
learns the value (P, z), he must then decide whether to accept or reject. Once the buyer accepts
or rejects, bargaining ends.
A buyer's strategy then takes the form of a choice of functions p(P, b) and a(P, b) determining
the response to a form offer P. If the offer is ever made explicit, either because the seller has spoken
or because the buyer has read the offer, the buyer's optimal strategy is trivial: he rejects if and
only if P is more than his full-information reservation price, V - bc(x). A seller's strategy takes the
form of a (possibly randomized) choice of (P, z) and a function a(P, z) describing the probability
of speaking given (P, z). I focus here on analyzing the Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the bargaining
process, where each side's strategy is wkest response to the other's, given suitable updating of
probabilities via Bayes' rule.
5 The assumption that V is the same for all buyers is clearly special. However, one could let V vary among buyers
independently of b, in which case increasing z would still make demand more elastic, and the nature of the results
would be much the same. The seller would still want to trade of the benefits of cost saving against the benefits of
capturing more of the surplus of inframarginal consumers.
6i assume that if the seller undertakes to do the notification, that the cost to the buyer is zero. In reality, there is
probably a cost to the buyer associated with sitting still long enough for the seller to explain things; I discuss this
issue below in the interpretation of the results.
8
Legal rules of interpretation
The equilibrium outcome will depend upon the legal rule governing contract interpretation. I
model the legal rule as a function X(z, o, a, p) that makes the legally implied quality level x depend
on the seller's proposal z as well as on the parties' communication efforts. Consider the following
possible rules for interpreting form contracts:
(1) Duty to read: z = z for z E [zo, zi], z = 20 for z < 2o, z = 21 for z> i.
(2) Duty to speak: z = z unless seller speaks; else x = z for z x[o,21), z = 2o for z < 2o,
= zi for ; > zi.
(3) Actual knowledge: x = x unless either seller speaks or buyer reads; else x = z for z E [o, zi],
x= 2 for z < o, = 1 for z > .
(4) Irrebuttable presumption: x = x.
Under the duty to read, the quality legally implied under the contract depends only on the seller's
proposal z. Whether the value of z has actually been communicated to the buyer is irrelevant; if the
buyer accepts a form offer without reading he assumes the risk of low quality. This risk, however,
is not unbounded. As I formulate the duty to read (and as it was often applied historically), the
seller's discretion to set quality may be limited to a subset of possible values. In actual cases
the legal limits on the seller's discretion may depend upon custom, the hypothetical expectations
of a reasonable market participant, the discretion of a common-law court,' or the dictates of a
regulatory statute. Here they are simply measured by the interval [zo, zi]. If the seller's discretion
is unlimited, then just interpret 2o = 0 and zi = 1.
Under the duty to speak, the value of x depends additionally upon whether the seller has notified
the buyer of his proposal z, If the seller has spoken and the buyer accepts, then the seller's proposal
controls, subject to possible limits on discretion [io, z i). If the seller does not speak, however, his
proposal z is irrelevant, and the legally implied quality is deterrined by the presumptive value x.
Like the limits on discretion, the value of i may be governed in practice by custom, reasonable
commercial expectations, or statute.
The actual knowledge rule is similar to the dpty to speak, except that the seller's proposal z
will control the contract terms if the buyer learns about it in any way, either through the seller's
efforts or his own. Thus if the seller does not speak, a buyer who accepts after reading gets the
tIn this regard, one standard for the lower limit frequently applied in actual cases is that of unconscionability, which
turns on whether the unread contract terms are deemed to shock the conscience of the court. In this model I abstract
from the complications imposed by the uncertain legal standards that result.
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seller's proposal z, and a buyer who accepts without reading gets the presumptive quality i. And
finally, under the irrebuttable presumption rule, quality is mandated to be z in all circumstances.
One may view this as the polar case of limits on discretion, where 0o = 01 = t. Since negotiation
as to quality is not allowed under this last rule, of course, there is no point in either speaking or
reading.
The quality x presumed under rules (2) and (3), and the limits on discretion zo and zi, can be
set at various levels; and the particular values chosen for these parameters may be as important to
the outcome as the type of rule chosen. The case for limits on the seller's discretion is ostensibly
strongest for the duty to read, since under that rule they may help to alleviate problems of imperfect
information. Limits on discretion under the duty to speak or actual knowledge rule, on the other
hand, prevent the parties from knowingly contracting around the law, and must be justified on
grounds of some other kind of market failure.
Let us assume that the legal regime in force and the relevant parameters zo,2x1, and i, are
common knowledge. One can then speak without loss of generality of the seller choosing x rather
than choosing z, and I do this in the remainder of the paper. It turns out that under each of these
rules, the seller's equilibrium strategy takes a particularly simple form; namely, either choose the
level of z that would maximize profits were communication costless (consistent with any limits on
discretion), and notify the buyer of the quality level, or do not speak and set x as low as the law
allows. To show this, it is useful to consider in turn the consequences for the seller of speaking and
not speaking under each of the legal rules.
Subgame following seller's decision to speak
If the seller does decide to spend S to notify the buyer of the true value of x, which values of
P and x will he choose? The answer is independent of the rule of interpretation. Since buyers
are then perfectly informed, expected demand is then F (~f), so the seller wants to solve the
problem:
mnaxir = [P - ak(z)]F (1)
It is equivalent as well as more convenient to think of the seller as choosing both z and the marginal
type of buyer, b(x, P). Then (1) becomes:
maxir = [V - bc(x) - ak(z)]F(6) (2)
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Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions to the seller's problem are:
1 = [-bc'(x) - ak'(x)]F(b) = 0 (3)
8a2
-b = [V - bc(x) - ak(z)]f(b) - c(x)F(b) = 0 (4)
and the second-order conditions are:
427r
=2[-bc"(x) - ak"(z))F(b) < 0 (5)
824a2= [V - bc() - ak( ))f'(b) - 2c(z)f(b) < 0 (6)
8(898 P
82 7r8 2 ir (82T 2
8ax2 b2  Kboxa) > 0 (7)
where:




Closer inspection of the second-order conditions shows that 89/8z2 < 0. Moreover, whenever (4)
is satisfied with equality, it follows that:
820 = c(z)f(b) (F(b)fI(b) - 2 
(9)
Since Or/8b is positive when evaluated at b = bp, it is a sufficient condition for a unique maxmum
on b given z that the right-hand side of (9) be negative for all b. This is the case for a wide variety
of probability distributions on b, and I assume it holds here.8 As an example, if one considers the
family of distributions Fn(-) such that
b - bo *(10)
F(b) -= (10)bo
then 82 r/8b2 = -c(x)f(b)("- ).9 In what follows, I will sometimes assume that F(b) takes this
convenient form in order to get an analytic solution for the equilibrium. As for the condition (7),
I will simply assume that it is satisfied.
8 In particular, (9) is clearly negative whenever f'(b) <_ 0, and is also negative when f"(b) 0 since this implies that
either f'(b) _< 0 or, if f'(b) > 0, that F(b)f'(b) s f 2(b).
9The family .P3(-) is just the class of beta distributionis on [bo , b1] with at = ni and A3 = 1; this includes the uniform
distribution for the case n = 1. One can interpret n as the elasticity of demand with respect to the normalized
marginal type, M4.
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Denote the values of b and x implied by (3) and (4) as (b*,az*). I will refer to this as the
full-information profit-maximizing outcome. Then, given the second-order conditions, it follows
that the seller will choose x = x* and b = b* if the limits on his discretion permit. If his discretion
is constrained, he will choose x as close to x* as he is allowed and will choose b to satisfy the
first-order condition (4). Let i denote the seller's (possibly constrained) choice of x, where:
o if z* < i z o
x = x* if x* E [oe i] (11)
iiif z* > 21
and let b(s) denote the associated level of b implied by equation (4).
Subgame following seller's decision to remain silent: duty to read and actual knowledge
Conversely, consider the possible outcomes if the seller does not speak. Under the dnty to
read, the value of x is then entirely determined by the seller's choice of z. The buyer must then
decide whether to read, and his decision will depend on his beliefs about the possible values of x
associated with a form offer P. Denote h(xP) as the generalized probability density function on x
(conditional on P and the fact that seller has not spoken) that is induced by applying Bayes' rule
to the seller's strategy. Similarly, denote H(x |P) as the associated generalized cumulative density
function on x, conditional on P and the fact that seller has not spoken. Additionally, denote
b(z, P) as the marginal type of buyer who would be just willing to accept (P, x) if fully informed:
b(x, P) = (V - P)/c(x). Also denote a(b, P) as the reservation level of quality just sufficient to
induce a fully informed buyer of type b to accept an offer at price P: x(b, P) =cc~1(i~ )
Given this framework, the buyer's payoffs from responding to a form offer P are as follows: he
can decline and earn Ud, he can accept and expect to earn Ua, or he can read and expect to earn
U,., where:
Ud=O (12)
U= V - P -bj c(a')dH(a'|P) (13)
U, = -R + j[V - P - bc(a')] dIIa (zP) (14)
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The first key observation is that buyers' preferences over these three alternatives are strictly
monotonic in the buyer's type. This implies that for any given offer, the sets of buyer types who
want to accept, to read, or to reject the offer are disjoint and strictly ordered by type.
LEMMA 1. Foaowing a form offer:
(a) If buyer type b is indifferent between accepting and declining, then all types t > b (t < 6)
strictly prefer to decline (accept).
(b) If buyer type b is indifferent between reading and declining, then all types t > b (t < 6)
strictly prefer to decline (read).
(c) If buyer type b is indifferent between accepting and reading, then all types t > b (t < b)
strictly prefer to read (accept).
PROoF: (a) Suppose Ua(b, P) = 0. Then:
UQ(t, P) = (b - t) c(x) dH(zIP) <0 when t > b.
(b) Suppose U,(b, P) = 0. Then there must be some positive probability weight on h(x IF) in the
interval [z(b),x 1]. Then:
U(t P) -t ( ) [V - P - bc(a)] dH(zIP) < 0 when t > b.
x(t) z(b)
(c) Suppose Ua(b, P) - U,(b, P) = R + f"[V - P - bc(z)]dH(z|IP) = 0. Then there must be some
positive probability weight on h(z|P) in the interval [zo,z(b)]. Then:
J (b)
Ua(t, P) - U7(tP) = (b - t)c(x) dH(z|P)
+ J [V -P -t(z)] dH(zIP) < 0 when t > b.I|
COROLLARY:. For any seller's strategy and form offer with price F, there exist marginal types b < b
such that: (a) all types t 6 [bo,b] accept; (b) all types t E (b, b1] reject; (c) all types t 6 (b,6] read.
Note that for particular values of h(zlPF) and F, any of the sets of types who read, reject, or accept
may be empty.
From the Corollary, a second key observation follows. The only outcomes consistent with a form
offer in equilibrium result in no communication. Buyers do not read, and sellers choose the lowest
quality level allowed by law.
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LEMMA 2. In any equilibrium following a form offer, no buyer reads, and the seller chooses the
lowest quality level allowed by law along with the price that maximizes profits given minimum
quality.
PROOF: Take P as given, and assume that some buyers read in equilibrium, so that b < b. This
leads to a contradiction, for then the seller wishes to choose z to maximize 7r(z). It follows for
the maximizing choice, x, that b(z) b. But then the buyer's payoff from reading is at most
-R +V - P - bc(z(b)). This payoff is strictly negative for all types t within some finite neighborhood
[b - E, b]. These types of buyers would be better off rejecting the offer. So reading cannot be their
equilibrium strategy, which contradicts our assumption that it was. This establishes the first part
of the lemma. But then, if no buyer reads, it pays the seller to choose minimum quality z = zo
whatever the price P. If sellers always choose minimum quality, the buyers learn nothing from
reading. Thus no reading and minimurn quality are consistent with equilibrium. Now, consider
any situation where = z0 and p = 0 and suppose P P* = argnax [P - ak(zo)]F( ). This
cannot be an equilibrium, for the seller can increase his profits by deviating to P*.10 On the other
hand, P = P* is supportable as an equilibrium so long as the buyer would believe that z = zo
following any other choice of P. |1
The intuition underlying Lenna 2 is that once the buyer reads a form offer, his cost of reading
is sunk, and vulnerable to ex post rent-seeking. If there are any buyers who do read, then among
them there must be one who values quality most. The seller, recognizing this, wants to choose
quality no higher than the level that makes the most quality-sensitive reader just illng to buy.
To do otherwise would increase the seller's unit cost without increasing his expected sales. But if
the most quality-sensitive reader is indifferent about buying once informed, then he would have
been better off not reading in the first place. Thus he drops out of the group of readers, but
then the argament can be repeated with the most quality-sensitive buyer among those remaining.
Accordingly, there does not exist a most quality-sensitive buyer among the set of buyers who read,
so the set of buyers who read is empty.
And, if no one will read a forma offer, then all types of sellers should always choose minimum
quality. Of course, if the seller always chooses the lowest possible quality, it is then optimal for all
buyers not to read, and to accept if and only if P <z V - bc(izo). The seller should then choose the
profit-maximizing price associated with minimum quality being common knowledge.
1 0Since z is already at the rninimurn allowed level, the buyer cannot infer a quality reduction frorn the deviation.
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This result seems very powerful, and the later analysis depends upon it, so it is worth some
discussion. The logic is similar to that of Diamond (1971), who argued that buyers uninformed
about market price will not wish to engage in any search in an otherwise competitive market,
because the costs sunk in doing so are subject to er post appropriation. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) extend the argument to the game-theoretic context. The argument is potentially of wide
applicability. Bagnoli and Khanna (1987) apply the same insight in a recent working paper to
explain why real estate agents are hired by sellers but not buyers.
The result depends primarily on two assumptions. First, the level of:x must be continuously
adjustable, or nearly so, else it will not necessarily be the case that the seller wishes to set x
no lower than the reservation level of the most quality-sensitive reader. Continuous quality is a
plausible assumption for many contract attributes, such as warranties or liquidated damage clauses,
bpt other attributes may be available only at discrete levels, such as all or nothing. For example,
a contract may provide that disputes are to be settled by commercial arbitration rather than by
the courts, which typically is in tie interest of merchants but not of consumers. Since there is no
intermediate form of dispute resolution, the seller will not necessarily choose any buyer's reservation
level.11 A different model, therefore, is required to analyze form-contract bargaining regarding such
attributes.
Second, it must be the case that the parties' interests are strictly adverse, so that all types
of sellers prefer to choose minimum quality when buyers do not read. If sellers differed in their
preferred level ofz, it might pay buyers to read form contracts to see which type of seller they
are dealing with. Conversely, if some sellers actually preferred higher quality, they might wish to
phoose x above the reservation level of the most quality-sensitive reader. In this case the equilibrium
could involve some reading by buyers.' 2 For contract attributes such as warranties, it is plausible
to assume that increases in quality always increase the seller's cost. But for other attributes, such
as the timing of delivery, or arbitration when both parties are merchants, the interests of at least
some buyers and sellers may not be opposed. Again, a different model is required to analyze
1'T probabilistic terms are allowed, all attributes become continuously adjustable, and the force of this objection
is diminished. For instance, a contract might provide for arbitration with probability p and no arbitration with
probability 1 -p. Such terms~ are not observed in practice, but arnbiguous contract language that is open to multiple
interpretations may serve much the same purpose.
12 As the foregoing should indicate, not reading is still the only equilibrium when all sellers have the same preferred
leveI of a, even if that preferredI level is above the legal minimum or even above the preferensces of some buyers. Any
buyer with a reservatica quality level below the seller's idea~l level would do better to accept than to read; any buyer
with a reservation quality above the seller's ideal level would do better to reject than to read.
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form-contract bargaining in such cases.13
The analysis of the actual knowledge rule follows along exactly the same lines as that of the duty
to read. For any given offer P, if the seller chooses not to speak, both buyer and seller are then
in the same position they would be in under the duty to read. Accordingly, a full description of
the actual knowledge rule is omitted here. As with the duty to read, the only possible equilibrium
outcome following a form offer is when z = zo and no buyer reads. Just as with the duty to read,
the seller wants to choose the monopoly price associated with x = o.
Subgame following seller's decision to remain silent: duty to speak and irrebuttable presumption
Both the duty to speak and an irrebuttable presumption remove the seller's discretion to choose
z following a form offer. Instead, the seller must set x = i. This makes these rules much simpler to
analyze than the duty to read or actual knowledge rules, since the effects of asymmetric information
are eliminated. Given x, the seller chooses b to maximize [V - bc(i) - ak(z)] F(b). Denote the
outcome of this choice as b(i), the profit maximizing level of b given x. It is worth noting at this




and from (8), it follows that b'(i) > 0 whenever x < z*. Raising the presumptive quality level
increases expected quantity if the presumptive quality is set less than the level that would maximize
the seller's profit under full information.
Equilibria under various legal rules
Thus far we have only discussed the possible outcomes of the subgames that follow either form
offers or full-information offers. The equilibria of the full bargaining games are found by comparing
the possible outcomes when the seller does not speak to the full-information outcome when the
seller does speak. If the seller speaks, he earns the profits associated with his profit-maximizing
quality level. If he does not speak, he earns the lesser profits associated with either the presumptive
13The assumption that reading expenditure is discrete is not essential to the result. If it were possible to spend a
variable amount on reading and acquire a variable amount of information, one could still show as above that the
assumption of a most quality-sensitive reader leads to a contradiction.
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quality level that he is legally required to choose under the duty to speak, or the minimum quality
level that he is driven to choose in Nas1 equilibrium under the duty to read. The seller will speak
if and only if the increase in profits from speaking exceed the costs of doing so.
The first major result is that under the duty to read, no one reads. The same is true under the
actual knowledge rule. The seller will speak if and only if the cost of doing so is sufficiently low.
PROPOSITION 1. The unique equilibrium under the duty to read is whichever of two outcomes is
more profitable for the suder: eitler z = Zo,b = b(-o), and a = 0, or z = e, b : b(e), and a = 1.
PROOF: It is plain from the above discussion that these two outcomes, sad probability mixtures
between them, are the only candidates for equilibria. Denote as ,r*(z) the maximum profit that
can Ike earned from quality a when bkuyer are away of t1he lsvel of m, Denote the seller's profit
from any given strategy (z,b,o) as 7r(x, b,a). Then it follows that ir(zo,b(zo),0) = ir*(zo), and
r(x, b(i),1) = 7rt(-) - S. Suppose that 7r*(zo) < 7r*(x) - S. Then the seller would not choose
(°o, b(zo), 0) with any positive probability in equilibrium, for he can switch to (x, b(x), 1) and earn
i*() -- S. In this case, (3, b(1),1) is an equilibrium; the out-of-equilibrium beliefs supporting
it are just for the buyer to believe x = -t in the event of a form offer. CQnversely, suppose
that 7r*(xo) < r*(x) - S. Then the seller cannot choose (x, b(i), 1) with positive probability in
equilibrium, for he can switch to (*e,h(i0),0) apI ears at leat w*(*o) (end possibly more if
the buyer's beliefs are more optimistic). In this case, (jo, b(xo), 0) is an equilibrium; the out-of-
equ4ibrlpyn beliefg pporting it are just for the buyer to believe a = So in the event of any other
form offer.
COROLLARY 1:. Under the duty to read, no buyer ever reads in equilibrium.
COROLLARY 2:. Under the duty to read, seller provides the full-information profit-maximizing
qualfty level and peaks when the co't of speaking, S, Li below a threshold level, and provides the
minimum quality level and remains silent when S is above the threshold.
PROPOSIT ION 2. The unique equilibrium under the actual knowledge rule is identical to the equi-
librigmpunder the 4duty {o rpp.d.
PROOF: Analogqus to proof of Proposition 1. ||
The second major result is that no one reads under the duty to speak either, and again the seller
speaks if sand only if' the cost of dqing so is sufficiently low.
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PROPOSITION 3. Under the duty to speak, the unique equilibrium is whichever of two possible
outcomes is more profitable for the seller: either r = x, b = b(x), and c = 0, or x = ,b = b(
andca = 1.
PROOF: This is even easier than the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, since the presumption that
x = 2 when the seller is silent means that the game is one of full information, and it is not
necessary to keep track of any out-of-equilibrium beliefs. As the previous discussion indicates, the
two outcomes are the only possible equilibria, and the seller has the incentive and the ability to
deviate to whichever one is more profitable for him.
COROLLARY 3:. Under the duty to speak, seller provides the full-information profit-maximizing
quality level and speaks when the cost of speaking, S, is below a threshold level, and provides the
legally presumed quality level and remains silent when S is above the threshold.
It follows from a comparison of Propositions 1 and 3 that the practical differences between the duty
to read and the duty to speak may be less than legal commentators have commonly supposed.
CORLOLLARY 4. A duty to read rule, combined with a restriction that seller not set quality below
some minimum level, yields the identical equilibrium outcome as a duty to speak rule that implies
that same minimum level from the seller's silence.
Corollary 4 is an equivalence theorem relating the possible interpretation rules. In particular,
the only aspects of the law that matter for equilibrium outcomes are the level of quality legally
implied from the seller's silence, 2, and the minimum level of quality allowed, zo. It does not
matter which party formally bears the risk that the contract terms are not communicated to the
buyer. Similarly, only the levels of 2 and x-o can affect the level of social welfare, as I discuss in the
next section. This observation refutes a number of arguments advanced by legal commentators on
the subject of interpretation rules. For instance, it is decidedly not the case that the duty to read
is preferable to the duty to speak if and only if the cost of reading is less than the cost of speaking,
as has occasionally been suggested. 14 The foregoing analysis shows that even if R is substantially
less than S, all communication must be achieved through the seller's- efforts.
Under the mandatory terms regime, of course, the seller always chooses z = 2, and since he
must do this in any event, he will not want to spend any resources by speaking; similarly, the buyer
will not read. This in itself is not worth special mention, but as it completes the survey of all the
possible interpretative rules one can observe:
14 See, e.g., Posner (1977: pp. 85-86), suggesting the test for enforcing line-print clauses be " ... whether the
wording, placemnt, or fortnat of the claase is such as to impose excessive search costs on prospective customers."
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PROPOSITION 4. Under no rule of interpretation will the buyer read a form offer in equilibrium.
Comments on varying the assumptions
Recall that we save been assuming ths4 when seller speaks, buyer learns the value of with
zero expenditure. The consequences of dropping this assumption should now be apparent. If one
as un s t;At speaking lovers the buyers cosh of information but does rot reduce it to zero, then
buyers will never choose to acquire any information in equilibrium, on precisely the same logic as
that used above tip drive Lemma 2 and Proposition 1. Since buyers will ignore sellers' informational
efforts, then, sellers will not waste any resources in attempting to speak. It then follows that the
unique equilibrium under the duty to read is when x = zo, b = b(zo), and a = 0, and the unique
equilibrium under the duty to speak is when x = x, b = b(s), and c = 0. The equivalence results of
Corollary 4 and Proposition 2 would still hold true; so would the no-reading result of Proposition
4.
Additionally, I have been assuming throughout that the penalties for breach of contract are
sufficiently high and certpiun that if the seller is legally obligated to provide some level of quality
x, he actually does provide that level of quality. What this means, somewhat unrealistically, is
that tpsere will be no contract breaches regarding quaity. One might prefer to assume that the
damages payable in the event of breach by shipment of nonconforming goods are determined by the
ezpectation measure, that is, that the seller must pay the buyer the difference between the value
of the good as promised and its value as delivered.15 In theory, the expectation measure should
vary with the buyer's type, although the tribunal charged with enforcing the contract may not be
able in practice to observe that type. If the buyer's type is observable e: post, however, and if
enforcement is costless, the seller will not need to speak.
More pecipely, suppose that the legally implied qi}ality level is ., but tie seller breaches the
contract by supplying a lesser quality x. Under the expectation measure, damages following breach
are equal to D(b, z)= b c(a) - c( j)]. If buyera anticipate the damage award, they should be willing
to pay exactly V - bc(z) for a unit of the good. The seller's problem then becomes:
maxw = [V - be(z) - ak(az) - D(b, z)]F(b) ' (15)
= [V -ex)- ak(:)]P(b)
15 See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code $2-714, "Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods," which
epR1eg the iF.. d feendeajs tale te~ bsch~ pf warspnty scss.
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which is identical to the problem (2) when quality has been communicated. For problem (2),
however, the seller must spend S to speak, and here in contrast no such expenditure is necessary.
In this setting, costless ex post enforcement of the contract is a perfect substitute for full information
ea ante. In reality, of course, ex post enforcement is costly and courts are unable or unwilling to
tailor expectation damages to the buyer's personal circumstances, so sellers may need to speak.
When ex post enforcement is relatively cheap, however, one might expect to see it used rather than
seeing sellers speak ez ante.
I have also ignored the possibility that a seller's concern for his reputation may lead him to choose
a level of r above the miniminn zo, even if no buyer reads the fine print. In a multiperiod setting,
buyers' disappointment with contract terms may lead them to punish the seller by withholding
future business; this may be viewed as a form of private enforcement. There are no reputations in
this model, unless one is willing to attach the term to buyers' rational expectations about a sellers'
strategies. Several authors have argued (e.g., Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1982)) that sellers'
reputational concerns can substitute for buyers' information. It is generally the case in finite-time
reputational models, however, that the equilibriun existence of reputations requires that buyers
have some uncertainty about the seller's preferences. 16 Here, since buyers know that all sellers
would prefer to set z = zo, a reputation for setting quality above the legal rninirnum may not be
credible. Nonetheless, my analysis might usefully be supplemented with reputational arguments
before applying it to actual policy decisions.
3. Welfare analysis
As the previous section showed, the welfare consequences of the various legal rules depend solely
on the minimum level of r that the law implies from the seller's silence. In this section, I therefore
abstract from the differences among legal rules, and focus on this minimum level. Let us change
the notation slightly from that of the previous section, and refer to the minimum level as x. In
order to characterize its Pareto optimal value, it is necessary to evaluate the efficiency of the seller's
choice of a when communication is costless.
16 For a fuller analysis of this point, see Wilson (1985).
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Quality choice when seller speaks
If the seller ever speaks, he will want to choose x = x* if the legal rule allows it; assume for the
moment that it does. Since the seller is a monopolist, his choice of b is clearly suboptimal. Is x*
the optimal level of x, however? Maximizing social welfare requires us to solve the problem:
max W = [V - tc(z) -- ak(z )] dF(t) (16)
b,z t=bo
This problem was analyzed by Spence (1977), who showed that for any constant quantity of sales,
the monopolist chooses excessive quality if and only if the marginal consumer's marginal willingness
to pay for quality is greater than the average consumer's marginal willingness to pay for quality.
One way of viewing the intuition underlying Spence's result is that when marginal consumers have
relatively high demand for quality, increases in quality make the demand curve more elastic, so
that the seller is able to capture a larger portion of consumer surplus. The prospect of capturing
a larger portion of surplus leads the firm to increase quality beyond the efficient level.
In the present model, since consumers differ only in the intensity of their preference for x,
the marginal consumer's willingness to pay for quality is greater than that of all inframarginal
consumers. So holding quantity constant, the seller actually provides too much z - an inefficient
result, but the reverse of the standard concerns of the legal commentators.
To demonstrate this, consider the social planner's problem (16), which has first-order conditions:
9W b= -ak'(z)F(b) - c'() / t IF(t) = 0 (17)
ax i= b
aW = [V - bc(z) - ak(a)]f(b) = 0 (18)
8b
Comparing (4) and (18), we get BW/8b > arr/ab, indicating the standard monopolistic quan-
tity restriction. More interestingly, a comparison of (3) and (17) shows that BW/8ax - air/Oz =
c'(ax) ft (b-t) dF(t) < 0. This is just Spence's result: the marginal increase in social welfare from
increased quality is less than the marginal increase in profits, because the benefit to the marginal
consumer from a marginal increase in quality, captured by the seller in the form of an increased
price, is greater than the average benefit to inframarginal consumers.17
1Asimilar analysis, which focuses primarily on contrasting price, quality, and quantity regulation, is found in
Sheshinski (1976).
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This welfare comparison is probably not the relevant one to draw for policy purposes, however,
since the monopolist does choose to vary quantity (or in our framework, the marginal type b) when
quality changes. This does not change the marginal effect of quality on profits, of course, because
quantity is already chosen to maximize profits. The marginal effect of quality on social welfare
does change, however, when we take into account the interaction between quality and quantity.
From the standpoint of the second-best, it may be desirable for the monopolist to increase quality
above what would otherwise be the optimal level, in order to reduce the excess burden of monopoly
pricing.
So consider the position of a regulator faced with the following second-best problem: it cannot
regulate price, but can set the level of z, or can set rules that influence the choice of x. A court
applying contract interpretation rules is generally in this position. Its formal decision problem is
to maximize social welfare W subject to the seller's first-order condition (4). Denote the solution
to this constrained problem as z**.
Given that the seller is free to choose b, welfare increases with z at the rate dW/dz = &W/Qz- +
(aW/ab)(8b/az). Furthermore, differentiation of (18) yields:
&2 W
= [-bc'(z) - ack'()]f(b) - c'(z)F(b) (19)
8box
which is unambiguously positive for z <*. Combining (4), (17), (18), and (19), and noting- that
dir/dz = air/8z by the envelope theorem, we get:
dW dr c(+)(b)~ r c(x)F2(b)=V1d +-{) [c(x) (b - t) dF(t) + c(2F2(20)




Then we can rewrite (20) as:
_W_ dr[ ] F___
- [ - (F(bf((b) - 2) [( b) + F()/f(b) ](21)
- ______ 1+c'(-2)FFb) f)b- 2)
f (b) /\f (b) /
I assume that the second-order conditions for a welfare maximum are satisfied. To evaluate the
second-best efficiency of the seller's quality choice, then, we need to evaluate dW/dz at the seller's
maximum :*. At this quality level:
=W ,':Pl(b-b c'(x)F2 (b)/f(b) (2
dQf'b)- 2)
db
= c'(az)F(b)(b - b) + cxFb
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The total marginal effect on welfare of increased quality is of ambiguous sign. The first term of (22)
is negative. It reflects the effect identified by Spence, in which a difference between the marginal
and average consumer's willingness to pay for quality leads to an oversupply of quality. The second
term of (22) is positive; it reflects the reduction in monopoly deadweight loss resulting from the
interaction between quality and quantity. Whether the seller's quality choice is too high or too low
depends upon which of these offsetting effects is dominant.
It is difficult to draw any general conclusions regarding the relative magnitude of the two effects.
For a special but nontrivial class of distributions over types of buyers, however, it is possible to
simplify the expression (21). Specifically, one can show for F(b) E F(b), the family of distribution
functions discussed above, that the seller's quality choice is second-best optimal. For this family
of expected demand curves, in fact, (21) reduces to:
dW _dir ' n
-- = -- [1+7 .1 (23)
To see this, notice that for all F(b) E F,(b), one can show b = (6 + nb)/(n + 1). Using the fact
that Fb fb) -2)= -(n + 1)/n, it follows that the expression in (22) equals 0 for any value of
b. To summarize:
LEMMA 3. If quality z is costlessly observable, and if the tumulative distribution of buyers' types
is of the form F(b) = ( ) , a social planner unable to regulate price will not wish to regulate
quality.
PROOF: By algebraic manipulation of (21) and (22). ||
When F(b) is of the form Fn(b), any change in x that raises the seller's profits will also raise
social welfare. Moreover, since the coefficient of dr/dx in (23) is greater than 1, movements in z
change welfare by a proportionally larger amount that they do profits. This just means that the
seller is unable to capture the full amount of consumer surplus.
The balance of this section will concentrate on the case where F(b) E Fn(b). Otherwise, all
conclusions regarding the optimal rule of interpretation will be governed by second-best consid-
erations of how the interpretation rule interacts with quantity decisions, and few generalizations
can be drawn. Since my focus in this paper is on how interpretative rules can affect and help
overcome the problems of costly communication, however, it is useful and important to examine
the benchmark situation in which costless communication is second-best optimal. In any event, the
preceding discussion suggests that this will be the case in perhaps a wider class of cases than some
might have expected. So to be explicit, let us assume:
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ASSUMPTION. The cumulative distribution of buyers is of the form F(b) =
Consider then the choice of the presumptive level i, and whether it should be made mandatory.
Denote W(z) as the level of social welfare associated with a particular level z, given that the seller
is choosing b to maximize profits. Let us now allow the legal limits [zo,i1] again to restrict the
choice of z. Recall that the seller will either speak and choose his constrained maximum x, or
remain silent and accept the presumptive quality i. From (23) it follows that:
W() -W() = (r(z) - ( 2)) ( Itl)> r(x) -7r(x) (24)
If i # 5, the seller will want to choose I rather than x whenever r(X) -ir(z) > S. But if the gain in
profits exceed the cost of speaking, then the gain in welfare must also exceed the cost of speaking.
It immediately follows that any limits on the choice of z are suboptimal, since if ir(z*) > 7(X),
then W(z*) > W(x). In fact, it is possible for the cost of speaking to exceed the increase in
profits from speaking, but to be less than the increase in social welfare, so that society might want
to subsidize sellers' communication efforts. This suggests a number of policy implications. First,
when all sellers are of the same type, it is possible to choose the interpretative rule to avoid all
social and private costs of communication. In this case we obtain the second-best outcome, subject
only to the deadweight loss from monopoly.
PiEoPOSITIn 5. If there is only one type of seller, the optimal rule of interpretation is for the
presumptive level i to be set equal to the level x * that the seller would wish to choose if commu-
nication were costless. Such a rule induces the optimal level of quality without incurring any costs
of communication.
PR.OOF: If there is only one type a of seller, then the full-information profit-maximizing level x *
is identical for all sellers. It follows that the social cost associated with any presumptive level x
is just min[S, W(z*) - W(l)]. Obviously, this is greater than zero if x $ x*, and is minimized at
S= xz*, where it equals zero.
An unrestricted duty to read, commonly said to be the traditional rule of the Anglo-American
common law, sets the presumptive quality level at zero, and is clearly suboptimal. The optimal rule,
in contrast, takes the form of an implied promise that the level of z is at the full-information optimal
level az*. Various statutory provisions of moderm contract law can be interpreted as implying such
prornises. Our analysis lends some support to these modern provisions on grounds of efficiency.18
18 For example, Uniform Cornrnercial Code § §2-314 and 2-315, in force in all American jurisdictions, provide implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness in contracts for the sale of goods. Under §2-316, disclaimers by the seller
mnast be conspicuous and in writing.
24
Actually, with only one type of seller, it does not matter whether the quality level x is merely
presumed from silence or absolutely required. When there are many types of sellers, however, it
is no longer possible to reach the second-best outcome with a single level 2, since the optimal
value of quality varies with the seller's type. If courts were able costlessly to distinguish among
various types of sellers ez post, of course, the second-best might still be obtained, but this seems
an unlikely possibility. In this case, depending on the size of S, some sellers will choose to live
with the suboptimal level x, and some will choose to spend S and choose their optimal level x*(a),
assuming they are permitted to do so and assuming the cost of speaking is not so prohibitively
high as to force all sellers to live with 2. It should be apparent that:
PROPOSITION 6. It is weakly suboptimal to require sellers to adhere to a required quality level.
PROOF: By inspection of equation (24). ||
An absolute requirement is not strictly suboptimal because the cost of speaking may be suffi-
ciently high relative to wr(Xz*) - ir(x) that sellers will not wish to speak. If an individual seller wishes
to choose a different quality level and speak, however, he increases social welfare by doing so.
The optimal level of 2 when there are many types of sellers is more difficult to characterize. It
is possible at least to say that if speaking is sufficiently expensive, then an implied warranty is the
best rule.
PROPOSITION 7. If the cost of speaking is sufficiently high to deter all speaking, then the optimal
rule sets the presumptive quality level x between the favored level of the lowest-cost seller, x*(ao),
and the favored level of the highest-cost seller, c*(a1).
PROOF: This is true because, if no seller wants to speak, then the increase in social welfare from
increasing x is just:
dW* a &;r (a)
dx =a0a dG(a).Jza=a oz
It follows from straightforward comparative statics on the seller's first-order-conditions (3) and (4)
that:
dax* - :: rk( z )f(b) + Ok'(x)F(b)
da ~ <202 (25)
d- <2 82 r 820 (26)
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since 892 r/Bx8b = -c'(z)F(b) > 0 when x = x*. Just as one would expect, a seller with higher cost
of providing quality would prefer to choose lower quality and lower quantity. From (25), it follows
that x*(a) E [x*(ai), x*(ao)], for any type a. Given the second-order conditions, air/ax > 0 if and
only ifz < x*, so dW*/dx is positive when x <x*(ai) and negative when x > x*(ao). I
COROLLARY 5. If buyers cannot costlessly observe quality when sellers speak, then the optimal
rule sets the presumptive quality level x between the favored level of the lowest-cost seller, x * (ao),
and the favored level of the highest-cost seller, x*(ai1).
Remember from above that if we drop the assumption that when seller speaks, buyers learn the
value of z with zero expenditure, then it follows that buyers will ignore sellers' words and sellers will
never speak. Thus it is desirable to set x between the optimal quality choices of the highest-cost
and lowest-sellers.
Unfortunately, Proposition 7 need not generally hold when speaking takes place in equilibrium.
This is because for any level i, there are some types a who do not speak but who would increase
social welfare if they did speak. Any decrease in x below z*(ao) or increase above 2*(ai) reduces
the profits of all nonspeaking firms, and hence reduces social welfare; this is the reasoning of the
Proposition. But such a change also causes the marginal seller type who is indifferent between
speaking and silence to switch to speaking, and this switch yields an offsetting welfare gain of
() g(a). The net effect is of ambiguous sign, so it is possible that it is best to set the presumptive
level at a level that suits no one. I have not even been able to rule out the possibility that the
traditional unlimited duty to read is the best rule in this circumstance, nor have I ruled out the
possibility that a full warranty is the best rule.
If, however, we are not restricted to a single level of x in all circumstances, it may be possible
to do better. In particular, suppose that the legally implied quality level can depend on the price
specified in the offer. This would seem consistent with ordinary commercial understanding, since
higher priced goods are commonly expected to be of higher quality. The law of implied warranties
recognizes this understanding in practice. 19 With one additional assumption, it is possible again
to reach the second-best outcome. Let P*(a) denote the price that would be charged by a seller of
*type a under conditions of costless conmmunication: P*(a) =_V - b*(a)c(z*(a))
19As Official Comment 7 to Uniform Commercial Code §2-314 declares, " ... In cases of doubt as to what quality
is intended, the price at which a merchant closes a contract is an excellent index of the nature and scope of his
obligation under the present section."
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ASSUMPTION. P*(a) is a strictly monotonic function of a.
We noted earlier that with costless communication, increases in a lead a seller to choose both lower
quality and lower quantity. The quantity and quality changes, however, have offsetting effects on
price. This last assumption states that the price that would be chosen when contract terms are
costlessly observable is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in the seller's type. Making it
entails a considerable loss of generality, and unfortunately I have been unable simply to characterize
the conditions under which it generally holds. If it does hold, however, it is possible to design a
rule that avoids all inefficiencies aside from the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing. The rule
that achieves this takes a simple and intuitive form: just ascribe to an offer of price P the quality
level that would be found in a good of that price if observing quality were costless.
PRoPOSITION 8. If the costless-communication price P * is strictly monotonic in the seller's type a,
then the optimal rule of interpretation is for the presumptive level i(P) to be set equal to the level
x*(a(P)) that would be chosen by the seller of type a(P) if communication were costless, where
a( P) is the type of seller who would choose P if communication were costless. Such a rule induces
the optimal level of quality in all transactions without incurring any costs of communication.
PROOF: Since P*(a) is strictly monotonic, its inverse function a(P) exists and is also strictly
monotonic. It follows that the function i(P) = z*(a(P)) also exists and is strictly monotonic.
The interpretation rule based on i(P) invites a seller of type a to choose among a menu of (P, z)
combinations, each selection of which is the ideal combination of (P, x) for some type of a when
communication is costless. Since his own ideal combination (P*(a), x*(a)) is on the menu, he
chooses it. But this is socially optimal in the second-best sense. ||
Proposition 8 can also be interpreted as establishing the existence of a truth-revealing mecha-
nism. The rule i(P) = x*(a(P)) tells the seller that he can claim to be of any type a', but that
he must then choose the combination (P * (a'), xz* (a')) that type a' would choose if communication
were costless. Since his profits under this mechanism are maximized at a' = a, he is induced to
tell the truth about his type. This enables the law to imply the optimal quality level x,*(d). This
suggests why we need P* (a) to be strictly monotonic for Proposition 8 to hold. Otherwise P is
not a sufficient statistic for the seller's type a, and no rule based solely on P can induce each seller
truthfully to reveal either his type a or his optimal quality level z,*(a). More concretely, if there
are two types a, a' who would choose the same price P, then the lawmnaker cannot know whether
the correct warranty level is z*'(a) or a,*(a'), and cannot reach the second-best.2 0 For the general
2 0Since quantity is strictly decreasing in seller's type, under costless cornrunication quantity would also be a sufficient
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case, then, whether an implied warranty is better or worse than the traditional duty to read will
depend upon a detailed inquiry into the structure of costs, and the distribution of types of buyers
and sellers.
4. Conclusions and possible extensions
The preceding analysis demonstrated that, in a context of form-contract bargaining with costly
communication, the background rules that govern the interpretation of contracts can affect the
terms that are included in contracts, the price and quantity of goods sold, and the level of social
welfare. It also showed that, when the interests of buyers and sellers regarding the content of form-
contract terms are directly opposed, the traditional common-law rule, which puts the recipient of
a form contract under a duty to read and understand all of the terms before assenting, and which
binds an assenting recipient to fine-print terms he has not read, will have little effect on whether
parties actually read contracts. In fact, no one will read the fine print in contracts in equilibrium.
Accordingly, there may be little practical difference between a rule that nominally makes the drafter
of the form contract bear the responsibility for communicating its terms, and one that makes the
receiving party bear such responsibility. In either case, the expense of any communication will be
borne by the drafter. Since the drafter's costs of communication may be less than the reader's, this
may lead to excessive communication costs from the viewpoint of the frst-best social optimum.
The analysis casts some doubt on the prospect that contract warranties or other similar promises
can provide a way around problems of moral hazard or adverse selection in product markets.
Because communicating and learning about specific warranties is costly, and because the decision
to acquire warranty information necessarily precedes a sale, the prospect of moral hazard can deter
market participants even from becoming informed about the terms of exchange.
Accordingly, under a broad class of conditions regarding the distribution of types of buyers and
sellers, the traditional duty to read may be Pareto inferior to a rule that provides presumptive
statistic for the seller's type, and one might think that an interpretative rule based on quantity (or the marginal buyer
type b) would work sirmilarly. There are two difficulties with such a rale, however. First, the legal decisionmaker may
not observe the quantity sold; this is especially problema.tic if the seller chooses not actual but expected quantity.
Second, and more irnportantly, the buyers will not observe quantity either at the tirme they purchase; all they can
see is price. If two different types of sellers a CZ a' both have the same ideal price P*, buyers cannot know from price
alone whether to purchase the quantity .F(b*(a)) (and get quality z*(a)), or to purchase the lesser quantity F(I*(a'))
(and get lower quality z*(a')). One needs therefore to specify more carefully the strategic interaction arnong buyers in
order to find the equilibriurn. For instance, if all buyers act as one, they can (and will want to) guarantee themselves
a warranty for the higher quality simply by purchasing the larger quantity. But this is suboptimnal when seller is of
the higher type a'.
standard terms when parties do not expressly negotiate. It is even possible for the traditional
rule to be Pareto inferior to a rule that prohibits all negotiation and supplies mandatory terms,
although for this to be the case the effect of the terms chosen must interact with a monopolistic
deadweight loss. In a significant class of cases, however, there will be no such interactions.
A number of extensions of and variations on the analysis have been suggested in the body
of the paper; several others are worth studying as well. It would be useful to study the effect of
interpretation rules on contract terms either when the interests of buyers and sellers are not strictly
opposed with respect to such terms, or when only a discrete number of such terms are possible.
The game-theoretic interaction arising from these variations may be substantially different from
those outlined here. Additionally, it would be useful and interesting to see whether and in what
respects the conclusions of the analysis carry over to different market structures such as monopolistic
competition.
Finally, the current analysis abstracts entirely from the administrative costs of enforcing con-
tracts. I have assumed throughout that if a substantive legal rule implies a certain contract term,
that the term is actually supplied by the seller. But if enforcement is costly or not credible, or
if the enforcement authority makes errors, the consequences of substantive legal rules will change.
Conceivably, the welfare rankings of the various rules could then be reversed.2 1 The relative ease
of administration of the duty to read rule, for instance, is commonly cited as an argument in its
favor, and this argument has been excluded from present consideration. A more complete analysis
would recognize the complementary relations between substantive and procedural rules in contract
law, and the tradeoffs between negotiation ex ante and dispute resolution ex post. All of these
extensions deserve further study.
21Fo a general discussion of this issue, see Polinsky and Slhavell (1988).
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